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ABSTRACT
As part of a series of papers on the topic of advance probabilistic methods, a benchmark phased-mission 
problem has been suggested.  This problem consists of modeling a space mission using an ion propulsion system, 
where the mission consists of seven mission phases.  The mission requires that the propulsion operate for several 
phases, where the configuration changes as a function of phase.  The ion propulsion system itself consists of five 
thruster assemblies and a single propellant supply, where each thruster assembly has one propulsion power unit and 
two ion engines.  In this paper, we evaluate the probability of mission failure using the conventional methodology of 
event tree/fault tree analysis.  The event tree and fault trees are developed and analyzed using Systems Analysis 
Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE).  While the benchmark problem is nominally 
a “dynamic” problem, in our analysis the mission phases are modeled in a single event tree to show the progression 
from one phase to the next.  The propulsion system is modeled in fault trees to account for the operation; or in this 
case, the failure of the system.  Specifically, the propulsion system is decomposed into each of the five thruster 
assemblies and fed into the appropriate N-out-of-M gate to evaluate mission failure.  A separate fault tree for the 
propulsion system is developed to account for the different success criteria of each mission phase.  Common-cause 
failure modeling is treated using traditional (i.e., parametrically) methods.  As part of this paper, we discuss the 
overall results in addition to the positive and negative aspects of modeling dynamic situations with non-dynamic 
modeling techniques.  One insight from the use of this conventional method for analyzing the benchmark problem is 
that it requires significant manual manipulation to the fault trees and how they are linked into the event tree.  The 
conventional method also requires editing the resultant cut sets to obtain the correct results.  While conventional 
methods may be used to evaluate a dynamic system like that in the benchmark, the level of effort required may 
preclude its use on real-world problems.   
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1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
For a science mission to the outer solar system, an ion propulsion system is designed to reach the destination.  
The mission consists of seven mission phases, where each phase requires the propulsion system to operate for the 
entire phase duration or only part of the duration.  Two of the seven mission phases require the propulsion system to 
operate only part of the phase.  For these two mission phases, the propulsion system operates at the start of the 
phase up until the specified operating time expires. 
The design of the propulsion system consists of 5 separate thruster assemblies and a single propellant supply.  
Each thruster assembly consists of one propulsion power unit (PPU) and two ion engines.  The thruster assembly is 
in operation when the power propulsion unit is providing power to one of the ion engines.  The other ion engine is 
in standby unless needed due to failure of the operating ion engine.   
Each mission phase has a different success criterion for the thruster assemblies.  For mission phase 1, two of the 
five thrusters are required for success. For mission phases 3, 4, 5, and 7, three of the five thruster assemblies are 
required for success.  For mission phases 2 and 6, the thruster assemblies are shutdown and not required for 
propulsion.  Table 1 provides the mission phase durations. 
Table 1.  Mission Phase Durations. 
Phase Duration 
(hours)
Propulsion System Operation 
1 5520 5520 
2 336 0 
3 9043.2 9043.2 
4 26280 13140 Propulsion (4A) 
13140 No Propulsion (4B) 
5 26858.5 25001 Propulsion 
1857.5 No Propulsion 
6 500 (plus 1857.5) 0 
7 9501.5 9501.5 
The operation of the thruster assemblies are thruster assembly 1 and 2 will operate in mission phase 1 and 
thruster assemblies 1, 2 and 3 will operate in the other mission phases requiring propulsion.  In the event a thruster 
assembly fails, the next largest numbered thruster will start and take the place of the failed thruster assembly.  In 
other words, if during mission phase 1, thruster assembly 1 fails, then thruster assembly 3 will take its place and if 
thruster assembly 3 fails, then thruster assembly 4 will take its place and so forth.  If no further failures occurred 
except thruster assembly 1, then for mission phase 3, thruster assemblies 2, 3, and 4 will provide the propulsion. 
2. MODELING OF PROPULSION SYSTEM 
The propulsion system was modeled using Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability 
Evaluations (SAPHIRE).1  The propulsion system was modeled using standard fault tree convention, while handling 
the mission phases used an event tree.  The event tree that was created to handle the mission phases is shown in 
Figure 1.  The mission-phase event tree is straightforward.  Mission phase 1 is questioned first and if it fails then the 
mission fails.  If mission phase 1 succeeds, then mission phase 2 is queried.  The event tree progresses through each 
phase accordingly until the success of the last mission phase.  If this mission phase (mission phase 7) succeeds, then 
the mission is successful.  Each sequence is solved individually to determine the probability of mission phase 
failure.
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Figure 1.  Mission phase event tree. 
Fault trees were developed to account for each mission phase success criteria and fed into the mission phase 
event tree for evaluation.  For mission phase 1, the success criterion is 2-of-5 thruster assemblies, which translates 
to a 4-of-5 failure gate.  For mission phases 3, 4, 5, and 7 the success criterion is 3-of-5 thruster assemblies, which 
translates to a 3-of-5 failure gate.  The fault trees for mission phase 2, part of 4, and 6 require the operating thruster 
assemblies to shutdown; therefore, these fault tree top gates are dependent upon the previous mission phase success 
criteria.  However, for conservatism, the fault tree requires at least one of the operating thruster assemblies to shut 
down for success.  The top gate for all of these mission phases was a 2-of-5 gate.  Therefore, if two of the operating 
thrusters failed to shut down then these mission phases failed.   
Individual fault trees were developed to model each of the five thruster assemblies, which transfer to the 
mission phase success criteria fault trees.  These individual thruster assembly fault trees model the potential failures 
of the ion engines, propulsion power unit, and propellant supply.  Each thruster assembly fault tree is identical for 
the mission phases that require propulsion except for the basic event names of the operating components.  The 
different naming scheme is required in order to account for the different mission phase durations.  The fault tree for 
thruster assembly 1 is shown in Figure 2 and can be viewed as a reference to the other thruster assembly fault trees. 
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Figure 2.  Fault tree for thruster assembly 1. 
The fault tree shown in Figure 2 uses modules or compound basic events in order to eliminate each individual 
failure event.  This allows for easier bookkeeping and fewer overall cut sets.  The probability for these compound 
events utilizes the minimal cut set (mincut) probability equation within SAPHIRE.  Therefore, the individual 
probabilities are correct, the only problem is many individual combinations are removed which slightly under 
estimates the fault tree top event probability. 
Common cause failure was also modeled in the individual thruster assembly fault trees.  Common cause failure 
was only considered across the two ion engines per thruster.  Common cause failure of the ion engines A and B to 
start and run along with the propellant valves to open were modeled.  Expanding the common cause failure across 
all ion engines or across the thruster assemblies was not modeled.  The common cause conditional probabilities only 
went to four groups and to model across all of the ion engines would require a larger conditional probability group 
to account for this correctly.  One could develop and add a common cause failure across the five thruster assemblies 
but many assumptions would have to be made along with correctly modeling what would cause an independent 
thruster assembly to fail.  Once the independent thruster assembly failure was developed and quantified, the four-
group conditional common cause probability would be used for mission phase 1 and the three-group conditional 
common cause probability would be used for mission phases 3, 4, 5, and 7.  Because of the complexity and 
development of correct assumptions, only the independent ion engine failures within a thruster assembly were 
modeled as potential common cause failures. 
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3. QUANTIFICATION OF MISSION PHASE EVENT TREE AND FAULT TREES 
The cut set generation and quantification of the cut sets for the individual fault tree mission phases and the 
event tree were performed.  The results from this quantification showed that it is very unlikely that the mission 
would succeed.  The results from the individual mission phase fault trees are listed in Table 2.  Table 2 lists the 
mission phases, the SAPHIRE mincut probability of that mission phase, and then an evaluation of the cut sets using 
a binary decision diagram algorithm.  A binary decision diagram (BDD) evaluation was performed (not in 
SAPHIRE) in order to calculate the exact probability of the mission phases.  The SAPHIRE mincut calculation 
overestimates the numerous cut sets that have very high failure probabilities – hence its designation as an upper 
bound.  A discussion of different attempts and assumptions used to analyze this model will be discussed below. 
Table 2.  Individual Mission Phase Fault Trees. 
Mission
Phase
SAPHIRE mincut 
Probability 
Binary Decision 
Diagram Probability 
1 8.5E-03 6.1E-03 
2 1.2E-08 1.2E-08 
3 3.3E-01 1.6E-01 
4A 8.1E-01 3.8E-01 
4B 1.2E-08 1.2E-08 
5 1.0 8.8E-01 
6 1.2E-08 1.2E-08 
7 3.9E-01 1.5E-01 
3.1. Fault Tree Quantification 
The fault tree quantification process was straightforward.  Once the fault tree models were developed for each 
of the mission phases, the minimal cut sets were generated and then quantified using SAPHIRE.  The different 
mission phase probabilities are attributed to the different mission phase durations.  Each fault tree was developed 
under the assumption that all five thruster assemblies are available for operation using the provided constant failure 
rate.
Mission phase 1 has the lowest failure probability, which equates to the largest potential for success (i.e., 1 - 
8.5E-03 = 0.9915).  This is due to only requiring two thruster assemblies for propulsion and the shorter mission 
duration.  The dominant cut set for this mission is failure of the single propellant tank.  The tank contributes 65 
percent to the overall failure probability based on the mincut calculation in SAPHIRE. 
Mission phases 2, 4B, and 6 all have the same failure probability.  This is because of using the same 
requirement for success and that is shutting down at least one operating thruster assembly.  Therefore, the top gate 
for these mission phase fault trees was 2-of-5.  In other words, if two of the operating thruster assemblies failed to 
shutdown, then the mission would fail and continuation would not be possible.  This success criterion is not correct 
for all of the mission phases but for handling this process in a static model it was assumed to be reasonable.  The 
shutting down of the thruster assemblies is important for the next mission phase; however, in probability space these 
mission phase probabilities have little impact. 
Mission phase 3 has a failure probability of 0.33 or a 67 percent chance of success.  For this phase, three of the 
five thruster assemblies are required for propulsion.  The dominant factor in the failure of this phase is the external 
leaking of the inlet valves for the ion engines. 
The remaining mission phases (i.e., 4, 5, and 7) are also very unlikely to succeed.  Mission phase 4A has a 19 
percent chance of success and mission phase 7 has a 61 percent chance of success.  Again these mission phases are 
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dominated by the external leaking of the ion engine propellant valves.  For mission phase 5, the SAPHIRE mincut 
calculation assumes that there is a zero chance of success since the calculation equated to 1.0 (i.e., guaranteed 
failure).  However, there are numerous non-independent cut sets, which causes the mincut equation to over-estimate 
the exact probability.  Therefore, this mission phase was analyzed further using a developmental BDD solution 
package developed at Utah Sate University.2    The BDD evaluation calculated the mission phase probability to be 
0.88, given this phase a 12 percent chance of success. 
3.2. Event Tree Quantification 
The event tree cut set generation and quantification can be viewed as straightforward or requiring extra manual 
manipulation depending upon the method of choice.  The straightforward process is to let SAPHIRE generate the 
cut sets for each sequence.  Each failed sequence represents the failure of that mission phase.  The fault trees that 
were linked into the event tree are the same ones discussed in Section 3.1.  This process generates the same mission 
failure probability as discussed in Section 3.1 for the individual mission phase fault trees.  Again, it was assumed 
using this straightforward approach that at the beginning of each mission phase all of the thruster assemblies were 
available for operation. 
The other manual manipulation ways to quantify this model was approached using two different processes.  
Each process will be discussed.  The reason these processes require more manual manipulation is based on the 
computational limit within SAPHIRE and the computer that was used to quantify the event tree. 
The first process was to use the same fault tree for each mission phase (i.e., using the same event name) while 
only changing the success criteria from requiring 2-of-5 thruster assemblies for mission phase 1 to 3-of-5 thruster 
assemblies for the remaining mission phases.  These fault trees were very straightforward in design and linking to 
the event tree.  To evaluate the sequences this way, a special process flag was assigned to the different mission phase 
fault trees.  This process flag in SAPHIRE allows for the success of the events to be carried throughout the 
evaluation.  So going from mission phase 1 to mission phase 3 at least four of the five thruster assemblies must 
succeed.  The failure of mission phase 1 is the same but for the mission to be successful different combinations of 
four thrusters must succeed.   
Given at least four thruster assemblies are available for mission phase 3, mission phase 3 uses this information.  
The failure of mission phase 3 takes into consideration the different combinations that came from the success of 
mission phase 1.  This information is used in the cut set generation for the failure of mission phase 3.  For the 
success of mission phase 3, three of the five thruster assemblies must succeed.  This information is carried through 
the remaining sequences.  However, because of the failure criteria, these sequences are not generated.  This is 
because using SAPHIRE’s cut set generation algorithm, these sequences are not possible.  Therefore, this attempt 
was not explored further. 
The last attempt at solving the event tree model was to utilize the fault trees used in Section 3.1.  These fault 
trees are similar to that above, except they use a different basic event name in order to account for the different 
mission durations.  Again, the special process flag was assigned to the fault tree top events in order to account for 
the success of the thruster assemblies.  When the sequence cut sets were generated, the number of cut sets grew 
exponentially.  This is due to taking account for the success terms in the final cut sets.  Once the cut sets were 
generated, SAPHIRE quantified them using the mincut calculation.  SAPHIRE could only handle the first three 
mission phases.  These mission phases are failure of mission phase 1, mission phase 2 and mission phase 3.  The 
reason only these three mission phases were generated is due to the large number of cut set combinations by 
including all of the success terms.  
If SAPHIRE were able to generate all possible combinations to account for the transition from one phase to the 
next phase, a major task would be left to evaluate the cut sets in order to prune them down to just those that are non-
minimal.  To handle this process, multiple post-processing rules would have to be developed.  These rules would 
remove all of the illogical cut set combinations.  This would be a large task considering the number of potentially 
generated cut sets.  This process was not expanded primarily due to the large number of potential combinations and 
the overall failure probability from the fault tree evaluations.  The overall failure probability from solving the 
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individual fault trees assuming all thruster assemblies are available at the beginning of each mission is already very 
close to 1.0 and expanding the cut sets out would not lower the failure probability. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The exercise to evaluate the space propulsion phased mission using a static model to this dynamic process 
proved to be very difficult.  The fault tree or straightforward event tree evaluation could be performed but several 
limiting assumptions had to be made.  The major assumption was every thruster assembly and both ion engines were 
available for propulsion at the beginning of each mission phase.  The other assumption was the unavailability for 
each of the operating components.  For each mission phase the component’s failure probability used the specific 
mission phase duration.  By splitting the component probabilities into each specific mission phase, this lowered the 
overall failure probability.  This assumption would mostly affect the single propellant tank.    
The use of SAPHIRE to generate cut sets using the same naming scheme for each of the thruster assemblies and 
allowing the success terms carry through in order to capture what thruster assemblies are available for each mission 
phase, showed failure in mission phases 4 and 5 could not occur.  This is due to the success requirement for each 
phase.  If three thrusters are required for success, then three thruster assembly failures would cause mission phase 
failure.  Therefore, one cannot have three thruster assemblies fail and succeed at the same time in SAPHIRE (a 
static model).  Therefore, these mission phases contained no cut sets. 
The last event tree option has merit on evaluating the model but the number of cut sets and the process to 
manually manipulate these cut sets became quite large.  Another problem with this option is SAPHIRE had a 
difficult time generating the number of cut sets required to solve the later mission phase sequences.  This is due to 
computer memory and other factors relating to software/hardware issues.  Therefore, only the first three mission 
phase sequences were able to be fully generated.  These sequences were calculated in SAPHIRE to have a failure 
probability of 1.0 because of the number of cut sets and the mincut upper bound equation. 
In conclusion, trying to use a static model on a dynamic process does not work very well.  Many assumptions 
are required in order to generate the failed cut sets in order to have some reasonable estimate as to the failure (or 
success) probability of the individual mission phases and overall mission.  The exercise showed the difficulties of 
trying to evaluate this problem without (a) using major simplifying assumptions in order to correctly solve the 
model or (b) using a tool designed for dynamic modeling situations. 
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